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The purpose of this paper is a critical review of technological change 
models which challenge the ascending development style in Latin America, by 
emphasizing local creativeness, constructive international interdependence 
and better environmental adaptation. Several models proposed in the region, 
including broader technology assessment associated.with socio-economic plann 
ing, the science and technology infraestructure strategy and appropriate , 
technology, are described. While they do address and propose to modify some 
of the more obvious negative aspects of the presently ascending model (the 
modernization cycle of the transnational development style), they include 
elements which have pro.ven to be ineffective in reducing technological depend 
ence and environmental stresses. 
There is a need to return to basic definitions of technological develop 
ment and environmental development, such as those given h e r e s o that diver_ 
sity and social meaning are combined, as are individual creativity and 
community protection of ecosystems. 
A. ENVIRONMENT 
All decisions, studies, issues and problems are circumscribed by tem 
poral, spatial, methodological and other boundaries. Much of the profes_ 
sional and political debate that takes place is related more to divergent 
points of view regarding the appropriate boundaries of a subject under 
discussion, than to the solutions which should be adopted. The limits of 
what it is considered legitimate (reasonable, practical, pertinent, etc.) 
to talk about, or study, or take into account, in the face of a particular 
problem or challenge, encompass a system. While organizations (in terms 
of organizational goals), professions (in terms of professional qualifi_ 
cations), sciences (in terms of Kuhnian paradigms), coalitions (in terms 
of agreements), tecnocrats and other groups may agree on the nature or 
definition of the system, which is the subject matter for their attention, 
most systems actually are in a constant state of flux. Goals, qualifica 
tions, paradigms, agreements, etc. are temporary and subject to interpre_ 
tation. 
Table 1 cites a number of systems which are presently used in socio-
economic and technological decision-making and systems analysis, including 
cost-benefit analyses and operations research, and which exclude environ_ 
mental costs and benefits of increasing interest internationally. The 
environment consists of the residual variables not incorporated into the 
system, and values which have not been considered relevant for the system 
variables. The environment can be all such residual variables or values, 
or may consist only of those "additional" variables and value ranges which, 




SYSTEMS AND ENVIRONMENTS 
- . Systems 
That part of the universe 
that is of particular interest 
to us in a given context.. 
Environment : 
That which is 
irrelevant . 
That part of the universe which That which is 
is potentially subject to constant or 
effective control. imperative 
Those factors which., are . 
circumscribed by individual 
decision-making (e.g. behavior 
of a single firm), and for 
which the individual directly 
suffers the costs involved 
Those factors 
which imply costs 
to the community, 
or for which 
the "free-rider" 
problem ari'.ses 
How to expand system boundaries 
Incorporate new variables, 
representing what was previously 
uninteresting 
i.Extend the reach of potential 
control to new areas 
Internalization.of externalities 
4-, Same as 3, 
5. The structure of production 
and consumption of material 
goods and services. 
6. Same as 5 
•Same as 3; the. Same as 3 
•factors also are . . -, 
characterized.by 
the' communi'.ty as 
susceptible to .'.•••• 
^degradation and • . 
as worth saving 
( i. e.„ degradation 
is unacceptable) .. 
Factors of "quality. Same as 3; also environmental 
of life" beyond the impact studies.^ incorporate 
structure of produc. the entire raw materials-
tion and consumption final consumption chain 
Natural resourcess 




Planning for the use of 
natural resources, or 
substitutes . 









9. Same as 8 




puts) which are 
not reabsorbed ' 
as inputs into 
the system, where 
inputs are finite 
(i.e.limits on the 
"carrying capacity" 
of the earth) 
How to expand system boundaries 
Ecoregional development; or 
more careful technological 
selection and displacement; 
or holistic approaches 
Same as 8; plus 
concern for1 more 
equitable distri_ 
but ion of' costs 
and benefits 
Same as 8; and lower consumption 
of rich countries; or more 
transfers to poorer countries 
Social, political Elaboration of new political 
and psychological structures or strategies 




/An environmental problem 
An environmental problem is a problem or matter on which serious 
disagreement exists regarding the appropriate limits of 1;he systems being 
studied/ discussed or implemented. The progressively deeper consideration 
and the resolution of environmental problems are facets of development 
in favour of the environment, or environmental development. Environmental 
development, may be analyzed as a permanent broad challenge or in terms 
of immediate specific environmental problems. 
Environmental development from; a longer-range perspective is the 
constant expansion of system boundaries, beyond what has been considered 
theoretically consistent, practical, methodologically manageable or polit_ 
ically acceptable. The goal is to convert the "unthinkable" into some_ 
thing thought about, and address the "impractical" by means of new policy ,, 
issues and "measures. Challenges, are encouraged against existing goals> 
qualifications/ paradigms, agreements, discipline or organizational 
boundaries, etc. The answer, at this level, is the instrumentation of a 
constant process of creating nev? .environmental problems and of system 
boundary expansion. 
Sevêral comments are in order -about t'.iis. Even in carrying out a sin 
gle decision or study,, the boundary limits between system and environment 
are usually approximate' and in constant evolution. When the variables are 
chosen, the joining of them in hypotheses, and the integration of the hypo_ 
theses in models, gives a content to the whole (hypothesis or model) greater 
than that or less than that of the variables taken individually and summed. 
Also, only in highly restricted (and thus mathematical) sciences, as opposed 
to more configurâtional sciences, are the measures and data for the variables 
likely to be sensitive to (i.e. controlled for) all the systems' spatial, 
temporal and other boundaries exactly as these have been defined in principle. 
Are excursions into the "environment" to choose and pick new variables 
and values for our "systems" always to be encouraged? Is more chaos in 
systems analysis necessarily better, since it means a faster turnover of 
variables? Are we to make a general statement that all scientific revo_ 
lutions and cultural upheavals are "good"? Or should we. withdraw from such 
an anarchistic conclusion, and set out some higher value for rating or 
ranking environmental problems; a classification of the variables and 
indicators related to these problems ; and criteria for identifying the 
variables and values of present systems which are worthwhile conserving? 
For the purposes of this papers systems boundary expansion involves the 
incorporation of new environmental factors, variables, indicators, values 
and feedback information in the systems, and the increase of popular 
participation in decision-making. Our interest is in approaches to tech 
nology that generally favour these aspects of longer-term environmental 
development. 
/Environmental development 
Environmental development from a narrower more immediate perspective 
addresses the nurturing arid degradation of human habitat, the alteration 
of material-energy-information balances and other human and natural stresses 
on ecological zones (e.g.the ocean) receiving attention at the present. 
Environmental development thus is primarily concerned with controls on 
and substitutes for highly entropie or wasteful processes. 
More specifically, environmental development involves: (a) monitoring 
for stress and degradation and for changes in energy-materials-information 
balances; (b) technology assessment in terms of social relevance and 
political negotiation or revolution as well as technological utility (see 
Graph 1); (c) orienting or creating new programmes in favour of the quality 
of life, and (d) expanding public involvement or representation, in order 
to assure a more accurate assessment of "needs" and to make decisions which 
give priority to the basic needs of the whole population. 
B. DEVELOPMENT STYLE 
The process by which environmental problems become discussed, and 
resolved or set aside is a part of the development style of a country or 
other political division. The style consists of a large number of inter-
related componentsj each of which is characterized by different stages 
or patterns of change. These components are indicated in Graph 2 and 
Table 2, which also indicate the different levels of rule-making in and 
for the government, and the impact of the development style and governmental 
policy outputs on the system/environment. 
/Graph 1 
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COMPONENTS OF THE DEVELOPMENT STYLE, AND PARTICULARLY THE 
TRANSNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STYLE , AND OF GOVERNMENTAL 
RULE-MAKING 
Component of development 
style 
1. Overall logic of the 
system 
Process of defining 
issues and assigning 
values 
Definition 
Ownership of means of 
pròduction. 
Role of the state in 
relation to economic 
activities. 
General rules for.the, 
allocation of production 
responsibilities, dstermin 
ing production levels and 
allocation of scarce 
resources. 
Most influential groups 
(power elites, develop^ 
ment agents) in defining 
environmental probiems. 
How environmental pro 
blerns are handled in the 
different levels of 
subjectivity. 
Rules of technology 
assessment and selection. 
Example¡transnational development 
style 
Monopoly capitalism, state 
capitalism or highly bureaucra_ 
tized socialism. 
Transnational culture. 
Organizational planning instead 
of market for relating production 
consumption. 
Preference to regimes which 
favour professional control of 
specific policy areas, and with 
the capacity to divert or absorb 
the political claims of newly 
mobilized groups. 
Sequential and incremental payoff 
for the most articulate sectors, 
increasingly using inflation as 
an allocation mechanism.. State 
policies dccided largely in 
consultations.of selected groups. 
Dependent development in the 
semi-periphery areas. 
Transnational community. 
Professionalization as a group 
political strategy. 
Selected environmental problems 
are packaged, as are determined 
solutions, and disseminated first 
as symbols of modernization. High 
degree of specialization,, plus 
some interdisciplinary work, in 
problem-solving, with organize! 
tional goals and paradigms very 
important in selecting technolo_ 
gies, methodologies and projects. 
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Table 2., continued 
Component of development 
style 
3. Production and consumption 
structure. 
Definition 
The structure of in 
come distribution and 
demand for goods and 
services. ' 
The leading production 
sectors, in terms of. 
linkages'. 
4. Technological and 
low-level ideological 
inputs. 
Thè variables of the 
systems, and the 
ranges of values 
considered generally 







Replication of structure of more 
industrialized countries," where 
these latter do not succeed in 
imposing the principle of economic 
division of labour. 
Emphasis in on middle-class con 
sumption, infrastructure develog_ 
ment and luxury goods, in this 
general order, although postpone^ 




ularly formal accounting and bud 
geting, as opposed to cost account 
ing) determines the most important 
variables.Profits as overall goal. 
Laboratory and statistical results 
and the technological capabilities 
of high-level technologies, large 
ly determine the ranges of 
acceptable values. 
Social factors are important, as 
long as they do not displace or 
conflict with the others already 
stated. 
The State may accumulate a deficit 
balance on its accounts, but 
decision parameters still are 
mainly those indicated here. 
5. 
Table 2., continued 
Levels of governmental 
rule-making 
1. The national or historically-
social project. 
2. High-level rules 
3. Middle-level, rules 
4. Low-level rules 
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Definition 
The general model of 
development which is 
adopted., indicating 
the general set of 
objectives or values 
of the most powerful 
sectors as'a-guide to 
government action or 
inaction. 
The general issues 
publically debated 
regarding govern 
mental action' or'' 
inaction. 
Governmental poli_ 
cies at the sectc 
rial or organiz&tio_ 




output s : regula_ 
tory and allocative 




Greatest emphasis on economic 
growth in rather narrow terms. 
Considerable decentralization of 
decision-making among productive 
and social sectors, using "plann 
ing" as a symbol of supposed 
coherence. 
United States' governmental adird 
nistrative patterns, and especial, 
service and production techniques 
generally serve as a model. 
Among such issues arerpublic/ 
private ownership, inflation, 
energy dependence, acceptable deb 
levels. 
Policies which promote consolida-
tion and linkages of economic 
activities. 
Social programs which are necesss 
ry for social/political stability 
Patchwork techniques in State 
economic interventions, including 
State subsidies, for decentralize* 
or private economic activities. 
Although there is considerable 
diversity here, the transnational 
community does interchange very 
influential points of view about 
generalized solutions for 
specific problems. 
/The existing major development 
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The existing major development styles are challenged in different epochs 
by an ascending development style. 1/ Thus the ascending development style 
is not always the dominant style in a country at a given time, but rather 
a tension exists with the other major development styles. The ascending 
development style in Latin America is the transnational development style, 
as described in Table 1. 
Different styles depend on the initiative and efficacy of different 
political actors. The transnational style is sponsored and maintained by the 
transnational community (characterized by the ownership of the means of 
production.and the top managerial, financial, professional, and bureaucratic 
positions, and by the possession of a .specialized knowledge which they have 
convinced other sectors to be indispensable for innovation and production). 2/ 
The hypothesis has been strongly stated that variations in development 
styles may have significant effects for the "environment". This statement 
could approximate a redundancy or circular argument depending on how 
"environment" is defined. It is our preference to divide this into two 
separate questions: (a) whether or not a variation in development styles has 
or is likely to have a significant effect on system boundary expansion; (b) 
whether or not such a variation would have predictable effects on the resolu. 
tion of certain key contemporary problems, considered as environmental problems. 
The transnational development style is, a.determinant of certain limitations 
and possibilities of system boundary expansion .in general. And at least in 
that degree, the transnational development, style implies restrictions and 
potentialities in dealing with contemporary environmental problems„ We will 
argue that the configuration of this style leads to a highly restricted manner 
of positing and implementing technological solutions for environmental problems. 
Governmental policies arc likely to be coordinated, but not totally 
consistent., with the development style. 3/ Government policy-making to some 
extent competes with private decision-making and .some of the values of the 
predominant development style, especially•to the extent that the government 
is sensitive to conflicting interests. These potential conflicts can be re 
solved by the existence of an institutional process of defining issues and 
assigning values which are respected,(to the extent of displacing or postponing 
fulfillment of individual goals) by the most powerful interests. That is to 
say, if the key decision-makers in all sectors guide their decisions according 
to certain cues or patterns (e.g. incrementalism, cyclical inflation rates, 
periodic elections or political movements), then a lot of the potential conflict 
might be softened. Reduction of uncertainty follows from compliance with certain 
general rules-of-the-gam.e . 
Although the specific patterns or rules-of-the-game for decision-making 
vary ariiong developing nations, the general result is to promote a working 
consensus in the transnational community and to favour the institutional and 
/individual members 
individual members of this community: transnational corporations, international 
organizations, professionals working in the decentralized entities of *the 
State, local private capital, etc. - ; ' 
C. TECHNOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT 4/ 
Technology refers .to. closely inter-rcla":ed sets of hardware, software 
(which include guidelines for product 'design, production processes.and 
facilities, and management techniques), human resource (and skill) requirements, 
and performance, guidelines., . A technology is that combination of these resources 
and know-how which "work" or "function" .together in a strictly technical sense 
(e.g. highly controlled laboratory situation), apart from contextual consider 
ations, in order to produce or modify a good or service. The technology becomes 
a technological package when it is labelled by a policy symbol,'and subjected 
to a series of technological utility and economic efficiency decisions (Graph 1). 
A technological package often is popularly known by a set of'"symbols loosely 
associated with some of its components, or- the- uses to which it commonly is 
put. These symbols are attached to the package, usually in the interest of 
promoting a professional, technical or commercial group's own goals. Later 
social relevance and political acceptability decisions atfe likely to take these 
symbols, and a respect for the inviolability of the package, all too seriously. 
Development which takes advantage of technology, or technological develop-
ment , is an attempt to obtain the following conditions in a country: 5/ 
(1) The capacity to identify and'translate the country's major socio- • 
economic, problems and possibilities into a coherent set of technological 
requirements, and to evaluate and prepare the technical and human resources 
of the country to meet these requirements, so that technological transfers 
are, made mainly .to help develop these resources, to cover unavoidable defi 
ciencies of resources or. in an exchange of technologies based on comparative 
economic costs. 
(2) The recognition and promotion of the capacity in all segments of the 
population to innovate, to irnplerr.ent innovations-and to'deal with their 
effects, with ample planning and consideration for the socio-economic 
realities of the country. • • . : . . . 
(3) Simplified presentation and ample diffusion of information regarding '- •' ' 
local technological options and challenges, in order to'create an 
environment of dialogue and experimentation on product design, operating 
procedures, performance guidelines, engineering and tooling, etc. at the 
level of production and services-. 
/ (4) The analysis 
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(4) The analysis of the separate hardware and software components and 
capital requirements of technological packages, and the capacity 
to negotiate for only those components, on reasonable terms, that 
are deemed necessary. 
(5) Awareness of the ideological content of technologies and technical 
decisions, recognizing that the importance of technology is not its 
supposedly imperative nature, which is a myth, but rather its 
pedagogical value.as it draws us from the known and perceived towards 
the infinite and inferred, and thus that great care is needed not to 
fall in the mistake of indiscriminately accepting pre-defined techno_ 
logical packages or professional paradigms. 
From our definitions of systems boundary expansion and of technological 
development, it is clear that both environmental and technological develop 
ment imply certain standards and procedures in technology selection:, (a) 
to take advantage of the alternative combinations of the components of 
technological packages; (b) to study the possibilities that the objectives 
might be reached just as effectively under existing social conditions by the 
application of one type of component without the other (e.g. implement 
software without investing in hardware);(c) to incorporate a wide selection 
of social and economic variables in the analysis of alternative technologies; . 
and (d) to look for less expensive substitutes, particularly where hardware 
is; used primarily for its symbolic value in inducing organizational changes. 
D. THE MODERNIZATION CYCLE OF THE TRANSNATIONAL STYLE 
The transnational development.style encompasses a pattern of selection 
and implementation of technologies, which we prefer to call the modernization 
cycle. 
The modernization cycle emphasizes the socio-political and cultural 
factors which influence innovation and invention, the makeup of technological 
packages, the selection of technologies, the agents and conditions of diffusion 
of technologies and the reliance on performance guidelines for the technology 
which will almost inevitably demonstrate shortcomings in the use of the techno 
logy and the "need" to revert to its source for complementary technological 
components. These factors are shown in a concise form in Graph 3. They are 
explained in more detail in Appendix I. 5/ 
A complement to this model is the Kondratieff "long wave", initiated by 
a major new innovation which leads to a series of specialized and localized 
innovation activities, followed by a period of intense competition and emphasis 
on "process" rather than "product" innovation. 6/ Naturally, the initial thrust 
of the modernization cycle in response to a major new innovation is related 
to the availability of factors and market signals, and governmental restrictions, 
especially in the more industrialized economies. Once a "long wave" is set 
/Graph 3 
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in motion, and technological R&D becomes low-key and low-risk, the cycle 
pushes the market for what it will bear, above all in the developing 
countries. A marketing and political activity is organized to promote 
the application and diffusion of the "process" innovations. 
The modernization cycle is inherently contradictory to environmental 
development and technological; development. It is the well-functioning 
of the technology, rather than human or natural environmental stress, which 
is monitored and corrected:; technology assessment explicitly emphasizes tech 
nological utility and economic efficiency rather than social relevance or 
political consequences; and commercial criteria override the consideration 
of basic needs. Technologies are transferred which are not adapted to local 
materials, nor to local living conditions. 
Contrary to the arguments that the present competitive system favours 
scientific and technological progress, the modernization cycle actually means 
that flexibility in the design and application of technologies is constrained. 7/ 
Problems are defined in terms of the more easily controlled variables, management 
is over emphasized, and there is a strong tendency- to discard options, including 
options which could be important for anticipating, recognizing and resolving 
environmental problems. Rigidities and unnatural constraints characterize the 
defense of technological packages, and thus of the organizational goals, scien 
tific paradigms, professional qualifications, political agreements, and other 
"systems" which are promoted or serviced by such packages. Even new technolo_ 
gies specifically intended to address present environmental problems are 
designed and engineered in much the same pattern. 
E. THREE MODELS OF'TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND CONCERN FOR THE 
, . ENVIRONMENT I-N LATIN AMERICA 
Several models of technological change have been posited for Latin America, 
with differing grades of confrontation against the. ascending style and its 
modernization, cycle of dependence. Qj Confusion exists regarding the' extent 
to which these models could co-exist or preclude each other, and the extent 
to which they are applicable throughout the region and in all sectors or are 
viable only on a partial basis. 
One model involves the introduction of environmental impact statements 
and the integration of technological concerns in global socio-economic plann 
ing. 9/ Usually in relation to a particular industrial sector or agricultural 
product. State, local capital and foreign capital interests negotiate a pack 
age of tax breaks, credits, import privileges, labour conditions, industriai 
location incentives., transportation rates and other policies; ideally, environ 
mental protection, promotion of local research, use of local materials, train" 
ing of local personnel and other concerns would be included in the package. ~ 
The packages fit into an overall scheme of State cooperation with international 
capital to assure stability as the country moves beyond the phase of industries 
lization based on import substitution. 
By this means, more consistency should be obtained among policies with 
explicit, impact on environmental, scientific and technological development, 
/as well as 
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as well as in the application, of direct and indirect' instruments of such 
policies. 
In this model, the interests of the transnational community,-and the-
functioning of dependent development (i.e. the alliance of transnational, 
State and local .capital, and the global, application of scientific and 
technological paradigms.),, are not threatened, but rather an attempt is 
made to modify the .terms of.their interaction in order to obtain both the' 
transfer of more,relevant technologies and a larger share for developing 
countries of value added of. scientific and technological work. 
There are exceptional casus in Latin ianerica of the State and local 
capital being able to induce the transnational corporations to accept 
greater local control and inputs, by taking advantage of national control 
of raw materials, by offering labour and general economic policies which 
are attractive .to the corporations, and by-.appealing to•competition among 
the corporations. As a result, the corporations are>motivated to finance 
lopal product research, to refrain- from tranf erring -.•environmental-unsound 
processes ana products to the developing countries, and to reduce other 
discriminations against these countries. Naturally, the larger developing 
countries are in the best position to obtain such "concessions", along'with 
the supposed (but actually highly exaggerated) advantages of know-how and' 
management technique, from the corporations.. 10/ 
Unfortunately, the conditions which favour the-local bargaining position 
are very difficult to replicate, and in general this model is riot viable * 
simply because it involves a commitment to foreign capital which is not 
interested in local development, a respect for foreign know-how which is 
antagonistic to local innovation.and a concern to produce for a privileged 
segment of the population. ' 
Throughout this Century,, an increasingly.large group of Latin Americans 
in the transnational community has .supported a second model: the science and 
technology infrastructure strategy. 11/ This is an attempt to institutionalize 
a strong negotiation position regarding international technology transfersj 
a strong economic demand and- political support for local R&D, and the develop 
ment of a greater absorption capacity for new technologies. 
This model, like the previous one, accomodates to the modernization cycle. 
The science and. technology development.'strategy has been adopted,-with 
certain.variations among Latin American countries, to promote and develop, 
especially under State control or guidance, a sat of technological support and 
regulatory elements deemed necessary for appropriate technological decisions. 
Table 3 indicates these support ,and regulatory elements and the decisions to 
be affected. The decisions to be influenced are those'of enterprise (public, 
mixed or private), Ministries, national .councils on science and technology; 
and national or sectorial planning. The support and regulatory elements 
are.encharged to a great variety of institutions-and services. 
/Table .3 
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Elements of technological ; 
support 
A. Conceptualization of the . 
factors that lead to tech 
nological development or . 
dependence 
B. Case; studies .'of technology 
cal ̂ development . 
C. Research and develop 
ment (R&D) -•.„• . 
D. Education and training 
of professionals 
scientists and tech. 
nician's ~~ ... 
: -' TABLE 3 . 
TECHNOLOGICAL DECISIONS AND ..INFRASTRUCTURE 
; • Basic decisions 
1. National development 
plans, including secto_ 
.rial .plans 
'2.. Normative directives 
and guidelines in the 
form of technological 
development plans, 
policies and controls 
.Elements of technological 
.„support 
G. Technical assistance' 
H. Criteria for development 
of technological infr£ 
structure and information 
systems 
I. Difusion of information 
3. Decisions on programming 
and administration of J. Technical standards and 
; production .and services : quality controls . 
(1) Investments 
(2). Selection and 
adaptation of 
technologies 
(3) Needs for- tech 
nical assistance 
(4) Conditions accepted 
on- .purchases-, of new 
technologies, or on 
technical assistance 
(5) Organizational and 
• information system 
development 
(6) Levels of production. 
. and services 
, K. Patents and . industrial 
.property. 
Financing of. technological 
development 
/In some countries 
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In some countries, the attempts to organize support elements began in 
the late 19th Century, particularly in relation to mining,, railroads and 
.other engineering work. Throughout the first half of the 20th Century 
there were sporadic efforts to institutionalize support elements especially 
in relation to industry. These efforts were provoked by professionalization 
in the region, by depression- and war-related "involuntary" industrialization 
and later by industrialization.due to. deliberate protectionism and-the 
detèriorating trade balances. Only on rare occasions were these efforts 
tied closely to a plan or program for development of the Industrial or other 
sector. During the 1960s and 1970s, there was increasing awareness that the 
support elements were not having much impact on technological selection and 
implementation, and there was a surge of developments to centralize or co-
ordinate governmental activities related'to technological research, transfers • 
and technical assistance. The restriction of transfers increased in importance, 
as a complement to the support elements, "here is ample documentation, indicia 
ting the meager results from these efforts.12/ 
The iiiost popular explanations of the poor results of this strategy are the 
lack of sufficient political support for the strategy (because the politicians 
apparently' do not comprehend its importance), the contradictions between the 
explicit policies to foster local science and technology and other ("implicit") 
policies which favour indiscriminate technology transfers, insufficient 
attention to bringing local science and technology directly to bear on private 
and public investment decisions and the inability of even those small countries 
which are well organized to regulate or control the operations of the huge 
transnational corporations. Many proposals have been set forth to deal with 
these problems. 13/ 
Other problems with this strategy have tended to be confronted only 
superficially. These include the fact that the scientific and technological 
infrastructures have not really broken with the international scientific and 
professional paradigms (and their accompay.ing status systems) which constrain 
scientific and technological path-finding; that the information used in tech_ 
nology assessment generally comes from sources which do not replicate the 
real conditions or needs of the developing country; that much is said but 
relatively little has been done, concretely to discover technologies which are 
appropriate for the basic needs and conditions of the region; that the 
infrastructures are highly elitist ând promote the unfounded presumption that 
creativity is a special domain of a limited group of people; and that the 
service and regulatory elements of the infrastructures have been very slow 
to alter their functions to favour systems boundary expansion or concern for 
immediate environmental stresses. 14/ It should not be surprising to find a 
narrow technocratic approach to technological change suffering from the lack of 
political support within countries, and unable to defend national interests 
externally. 
A third model is the most aggressive in favour of self-reliance and 
appropriate technologies.15/ This model requires, first, a complete change of 
educational philosophy and systems so that cultural experience and individual 
/creativity are 
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creativity are emphasized more than universal concepts; second9 partici_ 
pation by all segments of the community in defining technological problems 
and selecting solutions; and third, recognition that any community can 
legitimately challenge popular hypotheses or paradigms by citing its own 
experience or by insisting that additional socio-economic factors be taken 
into account in reformulating such paradigms. It is also recognized that 
an approach to science and technology, and to environmental problems, which 
emphasizes individual and community innovation, and which caters to the 
basic needs of marginal groups, cannot accomodate the transnational develoj) 
ment style and its modernization cycle. 
There has been an unfortunate and premature popularization of the ideas 
of self-reliance and appropriate technologies, so that rather than develop 
and refine a viable model true to these goals, there is'the danger that 
these themes will be co-opted. Even the international financial organizations 
and professional associations in the region which publicize the fashionable 
concern for appropriate technologies, continue to support narrow professional 
prerogatives, to defend overspecialized paradigms and to base investment 
decisions on technological utility and economic efficiency instead of a 
broader technology assessment. Appropriate technology thus becomes relegated . 
to a minor role or a backward linkage In relation to the "modern" technologies. 
Under present conditions, this third model is beset by a number of 
limitations. Although it does not advocate a total de-linking with cultures 
which apply other models, few governments are willing to sponsor the required 
dosis of temporary de-linking. Those governments which have done so, such 
as Cuba and Tanzania, were able to promote very interesting home-grown tecli 
nologies with many advantages for their cultures and economies, 16/ but there . 
is concern that the new technocrats being graduated in those countries may be 
less committed to a model of self-reliance and appropriate technologies and 
more inclined to other models as they confront the need for technological 
inputs for a full employment economy. Also, while self-reliance might seem 
to avoid the danger found in the other models of bureaucratization and 
rigidities over the long run, the self-reliant community is not immune to 
exclusive politics and fixation on a particular way of doing things once 
the euphoria of unleashed creativy begins to wane. 
Proponents of this model assume that it is relatively favorable to 
the environment, inasmuch as it seeks a constant innovation and adaptation 
and a recycling of residuals of production and consumption at the community 
level. The answer here to environmentalproblems, as opposed to that of an 
environmental impact statement prepared by an outside expert, is: we know 
better than anyone what it is we really want, and thus the matter should be 
left to us to work out and decide which technologies to develop and which to 
bring in. It is the community that must live with the problem., and with the 
/solution, and which 
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solution, and which has the greatest experience of coping with the ecological 
conditions of its own geographical zone. But no amount of self-reliance .can 
protect the' community from cpntaminations from the outside., nor can assure 
the 'commúnity awareness of ail the stresses and degradations which are 
threatening it's habitat. 
F., COEXISTENCE AND CONFLICTS AMONG THESE MODELS 
The ; three models of technological change each approximate some of the 
conditions of technological development, but,do not satisfy all of them. 
The more emphasis given to accomodation to the "realities" of the present 
power configurations and to the politics of professional and technocratic 
groups, the more elusive the goals of technological development and environ 
mental d e v e l o p m e n t . . . . 
A middle-range projection of present tendencies might.be merely the co-
existence of the three models, each specializing in certain geographical areas 
or sectors, and in ¡either high-level or low-level technologies. All three 
models take issue with earlier approaches to technological .development in 
Latin America, by .asserting that technology in an intervening and not an 
independent variable, and that the pervasiveness of the modernisation cycle 
is explained moré adequately in terms of institutional,social and cultural 
initiatives than in terms of a technological imperative. 17/, All three 
models recognize the cultural content of technology, and the artificially 
limitèd options offered under the modernization cycle. 18/ Apart from these 
areas of agréement, the'models support the present co-existence of very different 
economic and political structures in Latin America. 
It would be consistent with commonly-held assumptions about inherent 
differences ,among s'ubsectors of the economy ,as to technology structures 
and requirements, to posit that the technological change models would tend 
most naturally to specialize. For example, the first model would be 
associated with turnkey transféra of certain, techniques for the mass produc 
tion of consumer goods "and of technology f o r producing and. distributing energy, 
resources ; and thé self-reliance model would be associated with such low-
technology activities as artesian industry and. truck, farming. 
However, such associations reflect exaggerated assertions about inherent 
differences among the technologies themselves. 19/ The social and productive 
organization of a technology is the result o f a series of political decisions,-
such as those described by the "modernisation cycle", and reasoned arguments 
can usually be made, for alternative organizations of components, for. varied 
designs and applications and thus for"alternative institutional arrangements 
for financing and managing any technology. Thus there is. more flexibility . 
than' is admitted normally for the widespread adoptipn, of $ny•of these models, . 
and their co-existence is not a technological "necessity" or even a most 
efficient resolution of a technological dependence situation. 
/The simultaneous 
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The simultaneous implementation of these models would mean' the rein 
forcement of the very different production and consumption patterns (i.e. 
dual economies) which the models support, of marked differences regarding 
the role of science in relationship to technology 20/ and of very divergent 
approaches to education. The models also'vary considerably regarding rules-
of-the-game for State action, for the utilization of transnational capital," 
for the concentration or movement of local capital, for technical assistance 
and consulting work and for-local political organization. The assumptions 
about individual creativity, the importance of transnational technological 
inputs and environmental and cultural factors, are clearly different. Thus 
it is difficult' to imagine much interaction (including mobility or migration) 
among the sectors or regions affected by the different models. 
There are a number of arguments against the coexistence of the models, 
especially given the varying degrees of accomodation by these models to the 
modernization cycle. Theories of dependence would point out correctly that 
dependent relationships tend ..to create and expand a concatenation of structures 
at all geographical and institutional,levels. Theories of imperialism argue 
that there must be a very strong antidote to counteract the insistent expansion 
of capital accumulation and technological domination by the centre. Humanistic 
theories oppose the subjugation of any segment of the population to mere objects 
of benevolence or overlooking that each person is a creative being and 
should participate fully in his destiny. It doesn't make sense for a part 
of the economy to select technologies on the basis of profitability, and 
another part to use criteria of basic needs. 21/ In sum, continuation even 
on a limited basis of transnational community prerogatives and of the modern_ 
ization cycle precludes technological and environmental development. 
The formulation o.f an effective -strategy must choose not only from 
competing models of technological change, but also from different points of 
view regarding the sequence of activities which would be most effective in 
overcoming the lethargy and opposition against technological development. 
Herrera and Sagasti, for example, agree that a change in development style 
is a requisite to a real commitment to technological development. They both 
argue for a "national project" in this sense, and each proposes a more limited 
action which would establish a beachhead for such a program. Herrera would 
concentrate on the frontiers of existing paradigms in a single sector, most 
logically (to him) the rural sector, and promote community participation in 
the development and selection of appropriate technologies. Sagasti is more, 
insistent on the need for regional cooperation in order to assure the minimum 
critical mass of scientific and technological activity and sufficient 
negotiating force to override the powers which favour technological dependence.22/ 
The literature is replete.with recommendations of tactical moves towards tech 
nological development, which in practice have proven often to be disappointing 
and even to reinforce new dependencies. 23/ 
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Nonetheless, the debates on tactics should not be stymied by the 
apparently insuperable dilemmas. Enough experience with recommended 
tactics has been accumulated, so that the real barrier to development is 
not the.lack of ideas "which demonstrate feasibility, but rather the lack 
of careful planning and decisive action consistent with the goals which 
are sought. x . . , . .. 
Dilemmas can .be mere .thought artifacts which permit .short-run 
considerations, to override longer-term values.-for example, arguments, 
for heavy industry in Latin America face counter-arguments against..the 
impact of,heavy industry on the environment, against deferment ,of.. satis_ 
faction of the basic.needs of the population, on the difficulties qf accessi 
- on. satisfactory terms to advanced industrial technologies and on the need •; i 
' to recur abroad for the..,heavy and costly equipment for the new industry. . 
As opposed to the- position that Latin America should leapfrog into 
heavy industrialization, being able to avoid a trial-and-error design 
process, and to incorporate the most promising and proven advanced techno^ 
logies, a longer-term perspective may .favour a slower approach which permits 
the. retoolong or adaptation of the production structure to meet basic needs, 
of the population (rather than elite consumption) and the adoption of 
local technologies, for industry which do not depend on raw materials, , 
labour skills and energy sources,which are high-priced due to scarcity or • 
carteliaation. The selection of."more- appropriate technologies" could 
mean that the industry would be more competitive internationally in the 
long-run. 
'' G. ESSENTIAL MEASURES REGARDING .TECHNOLOGY FOR DEVELOPMENT.-
National projects intent on technological and environmental develop_ 
ment will differ considerably as to specific elements-and tactics for 
guiding scientific and'technological activities. The variation of 
"dependent structures" among the countries of the region, in part because 
of the tremendous flexibility of the transnational corporations to adapt 
their tactics to circumstances, means that tailor-made .solutions often are 
necessary. 24-/ . t 
Nonetheless, from the foregoing discussion it can be concluded that 
some general conditions are important throughput the region: 
1. " An ideal delimitation of final social and economic outputs, in terms 
of living and environmental standards for,the entire population, needs 
to be made. Priorities would be given to access for each citizen to 
satisfying labour, adequate nutrition, health, education, security and 
peace, housing, participation in deciding his own destiny, and „outlets 
for and constructive responses t<? „his own creativy. Services, products 
and capital requirements not included in these factors are of priority 
importance only if they are instruments for the outputs stated above. 
/2. All sectors 
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All sectors should be assigned production and performance targets 
in function of priority social outputs. Transportation and.energy 
sectors, for example, could not claim contribution to the society 
in terms of their ovm output, but only by demonstrating the contributions 
to priority social results. The most difficult aspect of this is the 
need to redesign the information systems to report on production and 
performance in social terms, directly comparable with the output 
targets. 
The difference between this ideal "budget" of allocations, and the 
actual allocations in the national accounts, is an index of the 
distortions caused by an inappropriate development style. Less 
important than the estimated discrepancies between the ideal and 
actual outputs, is the obligation of the sectors to justify requests 
for new investménts or their selection of technologies, either as 
direct contributions to ideal outputs or as necessary to "retool" in 
order to contribute to such outputs. 25/ A real revolution in the 
allocation and application of resources would take place even in 
mixed economies, if the State apparatus had to justify its investments 
and regular expenditures in such t e r m s . . . 
The entire chain of relationships between paradigms, scientific 
research, development style, policy decisions, technological innovation 
and the ecosystem should be examined to see where it is most effective 
to pinpoint'science and technology policy inputs. These inputs can 
be made- on the process of technology generation (by encouraging inno_ 
vation activity in the whole population), on policy-making (by social 
appraisal insisting on a broad socioreconomic review in socio-economic 
terms of packages, indivisibilities, dirty technologies, products, etc.), 
on information inputs (setting standards for appropriate sources of 
information used in technology assessment), on the consideration of 
local matérials and conditions, and directly on the ecosystem (by 
setting up monitoring systems). Most importantly, the multiple 
:effects of an investment in technological development are greatest 
when the creative potential of the entire population is reinforced. The 
creation arid selection of appropriate technologies are responsibilities 
of the entire State apparatus, and the resources for these activities 
are spread widely in any population. 
The process of technology assessment (Graph 1) should be complete, and 
should be inverted so that social relevance and political acceptability 
have equal ana simultaneous bearing with technological utility on the 
choice of technologies, or the choice of RSD foci. In this way, the 
ideological and cultural content of the technologies becomes clarified. 
/6. Hard and expensive 
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6. Hard and expensive technologies are -:o be avoided unless it is 
clearly demonstrated that the results could not be achieved by means 
of the reorganization of work, that; *:he new- technology does hot 
"require" unreasonable performance from the' workers and other 
environmental elements in order to -meet the projected results} and 
that thé technology does not "require" extraordinary complementary 
investments which are not justified :!.n terms of social opportunity 
costs. 
7. On the other hand, the soft technologies (e.g. management and' 
information systems) are acceptable only if•there is- prior research 
on the real, factors, that obstruct.the:, administration of programmes, 
• and on the social functions of- the - programmes and of the apparently 
negatives qualities of administrâtiox. of these programmes. Administrative 
problems may be none other than reflections and even the partial 
absorption of broader problems.- of the. society, and the increase of 
productivity in narrow terms,, may only .result in irrelevance. 2.6/ 
8. The technologies which are most important to help the developing 
countries towards technological and' environmental development, are 
training and,educational programmes and information systems. These 
are basic for all decision-making and.progress in'any sector. They 
should be the first technologies considered for any particular problem 
and to assure a capability in the long-run for problem-solving. Yet 
educational and information technologies are also-the most obvious 
vehicles of alien values which contradict real development, and it is 
imperative that national projects and -policies are most explicit and 
realistic about the political poorer. and'ideology which such vehicles 
represent. 27/ - -
9. Continuous development of theory is basic to any national project 
for'technological and environmental development. This•is the' 
orientation of basic scientific back-up which isimost important to 
assure integration of empirical feedback and the constant'adaptation 
of policies, to avoid "mystification" of'ideas while taking advantage 
of nèw innovations on the world market, to spur an evolution of 
concepts of appropriateness of technologies (and of environmental 
mutations which they might affect) and to move a country from a 
dependent structure to different stagas of self-realization. 28/ 
10. The use of cost-benefit comparisons is implicit, if not explicit, in 
most community and technocratic decision-making regarding the selection 
of technologies. These is no manner known by which such an approach 
can be made adequate to assessing key environmental consequences, 29/ 
and there is always legitimate grounds for questioning the conclusion 
of any cost-benefit analysis due to the subjective choice of variables, 
due to the generally unsystematic selection of sources of information 
/for the values and 
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for the values and due to the great amount of leeway which the 
analyst has in combining acceptable variables and ranges of values. 
At best, the use of cost-benefit analysis should be structured as if 
it were a free-wheeling pedagogical exercise. 30/ 
While these conditions are clearly antithetical to those of the 
modernization cycle, for the most part they could be compatible with any 
of the three models which have, been described here as alternatives to the 
modernization cycle. The problem of these models is that they, posit 
additional conditions which actually sustain dependent structures and thus 
reduce the possibilities of technological development or environmental 
development. 
In conclusion, development has been assumed here to combine diversity 
and social meaning, individual creativity and community protection of 
ecosystems. This mixture of goals could benefit from an eclectic selection, 
of tactical elements from the different models of technological change. 
However, a sharp break with present modes of technology assessment and 
transfer must be made. 
Less decisive than the apparent conflicts between technological, 
environmental and economic development goals, are the real conflicts between 
interests which would pursue economic development goals their way and the 
lines of action which are consistent with technological and environmental 
development. 
It is not clear that there is a substitute for revolutionary action, 
which regenerates popular confidence in individual and community creativity, 
and which is as tolerant of the small errors made during such creativity as 
the world is now of large-scale degradations and environmental stresses. 
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. and degree of propriety regarding know-how, and,these in turn are related 
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APPENDIX I . . . . . . 
THE MODERNIZATION CYCLE . ' \ 
(Refer to Graph 3) 1/ 
1. Innovation and invention 
(a) As opposed to the thesis which argues that invention is cumulative 
in the sense that.it is independent and motivated by technical 
necessity, it is more useful to consider, -the varied motivations 
and interactions of the inventor arid the investor in situations 
where the latter is interested in cutting costs, winning wars, 
obtaining status or decreasing uncertainties of economic decisions. 
Improvements, in contrast to inventions, are normally directly 
related to immediate market conditions. 
Prestige and information systems in the developing countries tend 
to be weighted towards the diffusion of innovations sponsored by 
transnational enterprises rather than innovations founded on the 
immediate experience and problems of the country itself. This 
means that there are more incentives, but not necessarily more 
opportunities, for creativity in more industrialized than in 
developing countries. 
There is a considerable potential for on-going, in-plant, minor 
and incremental innovation in developing countries, which is 
frustrated by the nearly exclusive association of progress with 
injections of large-scale technological packages and R&D actiyi 
ties. 2/ 
A key factor explaining the lack of recognition of the innovative 
capacity and opportunities for creativity in most Latin American 
countries is the generalized attitude that technological stagnation 
is inevitable unless a plant or infrastructure is provided with a 
minimum number of what are considered "modern" elements. 
2. The political definition of technologies 
(a) When a new or apparently technological item, such as a computer or 
locomotive, is offered in the international market, major interest 
groups study the manner to influence the definition of a technological 
packaged based on this item. They will try to affect the choices 
made regarding software types of personnel, marketing and access to 
capital markets which will be considered necessary for the application 
or use of the technological item. They will try to help define 
"computerization" for the computer, "dieselization" for the locomotive, 
etc. The particular problems, needs and resources of the societies 





or organizations which will receive the technological package are 
less important to these groups than are the conditions of the 
, society or organization for accepting the technology. 
(b) A technological package incorporates instructions for its use, 
indications of what performance data should be collected, and a 
set of performance standards against which this data are to be 
compared. These data and evaluation components (i.e.' know-how), 
which are part of any technological change (or it may be the core 
or the change), are designed to record and evaluate events as if 
the technology was being implemented in any culture. These criteria 
do-not demonstrate whether or not the technology is suitable or 
appropriate, but rather to what extent the recipient society or 
organization meets modern standards, or has successfully applied 
modern techniques. The feedback- is technique-oriented, not oriented 
to cultural or organizational purposes or opportunities. It is 
presumed- that the society or organization needs to adapt. The data 
and evaluation components of technological packages are thus perhaps 
one of the most subtle and effective instruments of dependence. 3/ 
(c) Technological packages commonly include normative assertions that 
the technology "requires" certain conditions or complementary 
investmentswhich become accepted on face-value without empirical 
.evidence. 
The selection of technologies 
(a) The selection of technologies in recipient organizations or societies 
is closely linked to the strategy of reducing uncertainty. For that 
reason, the selection is often influenced by the following attitudes: 
1. Preference. for hardware solutions, even for problems of 
organization and administration which have historically resisted 
resolution by the introduction of machines. 
2. An emphasis on continuing large-scale capital 'investments, rather 
than on marginal less-costly changes. 
3. Use of the technology for a particular set of services or products, 
rather than with the wide range;of possible services or products 
which could be obtained, from the technology. 
A view of socio-political factors, and of labour, as forces to 
overcome or avoid rather than as sources of useful energy and 
checks to assure that the technology is relevant to social 
conditions and objectives. • 
/(b) Due to the process 
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(b) Due to the process by which technological packages are commonly 
defined, the selection of technologies is confined artificially to 
a limited set of choices. Thus, while technological progress is the 
widening of choices which are theoretically possible, this progress 
can lead to the sophisticated presentation of a limited number of 
possibilities which are in fact considered. Key reasons why develop^ 
ing countries accept this are (i) the generalized belief that there 
are technological imperatives, and that these, together with, rising 
expectations, practically make the production obligaroty of 
determined goods and services, (ii) the attractiveness of analyzing 
a society's or organization's shortcomings in terms of the ability 
to adapt to a pre-defined technology rather than diagnosing problems 
ana resources and choosing or inventing technologies appropriate for 
those problems or resources, (iii) the tendency to try to narrow the 
number of variables considered during the search for solutions 
("problemistic search") and (iv) the defense by professional, or other 
groups of an intermediary role with regard to technology, using the 
• myth of "anti-politics". 
(c) Contradictions between the social implications of the technology which 
is selected and the pronounced glooal partisan ideology of the 
professional or technician generally go unrecognized by the professional 
or technician himself. The professional or technician disassociates 
three levels of ideology, not realizing that he is pronouncing and 
acting on contradictory principles. His global partisan ideology is. 
normally associated with a political party or an attitude towards 
economic and political development. At a different level, he. justifies 
and describes his professional or technical work in terms of social 
and economic consequences, often with only a vague relation to the 
global partisan ideology. Finally, detailed examination of the content 
of his work usually demonstrates a very different ideological orientation, 
.often very surprising to the professional or technician when his 
attention is called to it.4/ 
(d) Particular criteria regarding the appropriate variables and values 
to be used in evaluations or analyses- of technological alternatives 
usually accompany or become identified with the technological package. 
The "legitimate" range.of values which can be assigned to such 
coefficients as useful life of the machine, residual value of machines 
that are replaced, investment/maintenance ratios and rate <?f return 
is generally quite ample (as much as 50% difference between the lowest 
and highest acceptable values). Almost.any technological selection 
can be justified by the right combination of legitimate values for 
the basic coefficients, irrespective of the values which are obtained 
empirically for the other variables. 
/4. The agents and. 
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The agents and conditions of diffusion of technologies 
(a) The transnational corporations are prime promoters of technological 
packages, often with a direct economic interest in this, diffusion. 
Four prime strategies are used. First, the corporations invest 
considerably in the diffusion and selling of symbols, including trade_ 
marks, of the technological packages. Second, they attempt to maintain 
an artificial scarcity of technological information, taking advantage 
of legal devices (such as patents) to create such scarcity, and refusing 
to sell only the information they control but rather insisting on the 
purchase of entire technological packages which include such information. 
.Third, they multiply the benefits from their control of "know-how" 
by means of different royalties, overpricing and other devices, especial_ 
ly where foreign subsidiaries can be established, all of which has been 
analyzed in depth by previous documents. 5/ Fourth, the corporations 
have acquired increasing sophistication in their methods of obtaining 
general legitimization and acceptance of their own technologies. 
Recognition and support for the value of the technologies for universal 
application in the form that they are offered by the corporations, is 
obtained indirectly from banks and international organizations. 
(b) Professional groups in the organizations or societies which might apply 
or use a new technology identify themselves as the proper experts 
regarding the administration of the technology, to the extent that the 
technology appears to offer the possibilities of domination of a line 
of work which appeals to them and will not be disruptive of the stable 
environment which they consider conducive to their work. The profession 
als or technicians expand their work to incorporate new concerns and 
technologies usually in a long process of negotiation with their 
institutions of work, and with other professions. Care is exercised to 
protect the exclusive "prerogatives" which have already been obtained 
by the profession to- make decisions or studies, and to protect the 
"autonomy" of certain institutions (e.g. public enterprises) which 
the professionals or technicians come to consider as their own 
political domain. 
(c) The transfer of inappropriate technological packages, and the control 
of decisions regarding those technologies by professional or technical 
groups, depend on the existence of a national political structure 
favorable to such an approach to the selection of technologies. Among 
the structural factors are the following: 
1. A tradition of assigning specific policy concerns to decision-
making by professional groups. Career personnel systems and 
closed information systems, with special personal channels for 
access by elite groups to the professionals, are indicative of 
/such a tradition. 
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such a tradition."'Another indicator is the boom in State 
enterprises which try to imitate organizational standards of 
the transnational corporations and to monopolize an economic sub-
sector in a country. Such enterprises, as noted above, often 
become dominated by professional groups. 
2. A regular sequencing or incrementing of economic benefits which 
are made to the-, most powerful political pressure groups, for 
example by means of cyclical credit policies which lead to rather 
regular variations in .inflation rates. 
3. A skillful centralized governmental apparatus capable of absorbing 
or repressing the pressures by newly'mobilized "pressure groups 
for governmental expenditures attuned to their more immediate 
needs. 
"There are certain economic policies which tend to reinforce the 
acquisition pf technological packages, unless explicit corrective 
measures are applied. Among such policies is that of import sub 
stitution. 
The modernization cycle is also reinforced by the following condi 
tions: ., ; • 
1. The conditions of financing of development projects (e.g. tied 
loans), which require .the use of the technology of the country 
making the loan. These same conditions are applied in a more 
subtle form,- when the specifications of technology to be purchased 
under financing by international organizations are such that the 
recipient country is forced to recur to certain suppliers. 
2. Direct foreign investment leads to a stronger, conformity, by the 
subsidiaries, with restrictive conditions, overpricing, clauses, 
etc. 6/ It also implies considerably less investment in the 
developing country in R&D. 7/ 
3. The inadequate development of .'.ocal scientific and technological 
research and development (R&D) reinforces the dependence on 
packages from outside. 
The public enterprises created to produce for export in 
combination with transnational corporations, and to monopolize 
local markets with regard to a subsector, will adopt the tech 
nological specifications and quality controls of the corporations. 
8 / .. 
/5. Those economic 
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5. Those economic and technological factors which are conducive to 
a higher proportion of "commercial technology" (proprietary 
knowledge) in the technological package. 
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